PES, Privacy Enhanced Sockets, is a user-level subsystem providing network privacy for stream sockets. This document presents its design and implementation in UNIX and Microsoft Windows systems. PES provides secure channels on top of standard stream sockets, allowing existing client-server applications to transparently use secure channels instead of standard remote connections. PES is composed of two entities which can be almost transparently added to existing systems: a dynamic library and a trusted proxy server. All cryptographic details concerning the establishment of secure channels are solely handled by instances of these two entities using the Diffie-Hellman public-key algorithm. Man-in-the-Middle attacks are prevented using asymmetric cryptography for host authentication. Host's public keys are acquired and stored on a per-user basis such as for PGP, which does not require central management but only a reduced user intervention. PES has been tested with several applications -telnet, ftp, several X11 and WWW applications -in SunOS, Solaris and Microsoft Windows 3.1. Performance tests run in Sun SPARCstations show a low latency time and an acceptable throughput degradation.
Introduction
Distributed systems connected by insecure networks raise privacy problems. Undetectable attackers can snoop network packets and, through proper filtering, gather relevant information such as traffic flows and data exchanged. Network privacy implies encoding transmitted packets and, although less critical, masking traffic flows.
Unfortunately, the TCP/IP protocol suite used by remote stream connections does not provide network privacy. All data encryption must be handled by application programs. Since most of the Internet traffic is unencrypted, well-known connections, such as those used by TCP/IP services (e.g. rlogin), are easy targets for network snoopers.
The purpose of PES is to transparently provide network privacy to existing client-server applications, replacing remote stream connections by secure channels. These secure channels use end-to-end encryption to support private remote communication between clients and servers. Moreover, the underlying connections used by secure channels use a fixed port, thus not revealing the connections they replace; this complicates traffic flow analysis, reducing the threat of known-plaintext cryptanalysis of well-known connections. The cipher mode used in PES secure channels also provides a lightweight integrity control of received messages in order to detect message tampering, replay and forgery. The current implementation of PES handles solely stream sockets. We expect in the near future to extend its functionality by implementing secure channels on top of datagrams and connection-oriented services accessed via TLI.
PES uses a generic user-level approach to add network security for stream sockets, transparently offering secure channels by means of a new dynamic library and trusted proxy servers. Client applications using stream sockets through dynamic libraries load the PES library before the former libraries, yielding transparent confidential communications through the network. On the servers side there are two alternatives to use secure channels (see diagrams I and II of (I) Servers load the PES library to directly communicate with clients through secure channels, and PES proxies assist the creation of those secure channels.
(II) Servers remain unchanged, being locally accessed by PES proxies that carry on confidential communications with remote clients using the PES library.
PES dynamic libraries and proxies generate and distribute the cryptographic parameters of each secure channel using the Diffie-Hellman public-key algorithm [1] (see Figure 7 in Appendix A). Man-in-the-Middle attacks to this algorithm are prevented using asymmetric cryptography for host authentication. Each host running a PES proxy has a pair of keys, one private and one public, that are used to authenticate the local PES proxy. Hosts public keys are distributed by proxies and should be acquired and stored, like PGP public keys, on a per-user basis for later use by client applications using the PES library.
To integrate PES with other key distribution mechanisms applications must be slightly modified. In the initialization phase, encryption/decryption keys for PES secure channels are acquired from an independent Key Distribution Center (KDC) and downloaded to the PES library (see Figure 2) ; PES proxies are not needed. The rest of the application remains unchanged and uses standard sockets.
The PES dynamic library and proxy are currently available for Sun UNIX systems, both SunOS and Solaris, and the library for clients is also available for Microsoft Windows 3.1. The ¡ A dynamic library means, in this context, a library that applications load when starting their execution. PES secure channels have been transparently used in all those systems with several clientserver applications (e.g telnet, ftp, and several X11 and WWW applications) yielding acceptable performance. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section presents related work. Section 3 describes the architecture of PES. Sections 4 and 5 describe the implementation of secure channels on top of stream sockets. Performance evaluations are addressed in section 6. In section 7 we draw conclusions and present the current implementation status.
Related work
Several approaches have been taken to overcome the lack of network privacy of common network protocols, namely TCP/IP. Those approaches, however, are either restricted to specific applications, or suffer from limitations constraining their widespread availability. PES provides a portable and easy to use solution for many applications and systems.
Application-specific approaches towards network privacy in client-server interactions typically focus on the protection of highly sensitive data, such as passwords. For example, telnet, ftp and some RDBMSs were modified to avoid the exposure of such data on the network. STEL [2] and ssh (cf. http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh) are secure versions of telnet and rlogin/rsh programs going one step further, encrypting all client-server data exchange. A Generic Security Service API [3] was designed to simplify developers' efforts to provide network security to particular client-server applications, as well as some secure communication protocols, like the Private Communication Technology Protocol and the Secure Sockets Layer (PCT [4] and SSL [5] ). These two protocols are similar and both allow client-server applications using a reliable transport protocol, like TCP/IP, to communicate in a way that prevents eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. However, and unlike for servers accessed using PES, servers using PCT or SSL must be modified in order to use two different network addresses, one for standard unsecure connections, and another for secure connections.
The Kerberos authentication service [6] provides client applications with secret session keys to privately interact with a limited set of servers. However, these private interactions using session keys must be implemented in both clients and servers, either using specific approaches or existing libraries. In that respect, PES can be viewed as a complement to Kerberos. Client-server applications using the Kerberos authentication could use Kerberos session keys to configure PES secure channels. In other words, Kerberos is a potential Key Distribution Center for PES, as presented in Figure 2 . This possible use of PES, although promising, will not be further addressed in this document because we are mainly concerned with presenting the potential of PES when used transparently by existing applications.
There also exist some generic user-level approaches to network privacy. CFS [7] , a cryptographic file system for UNIX, provides transparent access to encrypted files stored remotely without exposing their original data in the network. However, CFS is a user-level NFS-like server with an extended RPC interface, thus, only solving the network confidentiality problem for files accessed locally through the UNIX file interface.
System-level solutions (implemented in network layers) are more likely to allow existing applications to take advantage of security enhancements. However, these solutions can only be useful if agreed upon and implemented by a significant number of system vendors. Examples of system-level solutions for network security are swIPe [8] and two commercial products, SecureWare's HannaH and Cylink's SecureLan (cf. http://www.sware.com and http://www.cylink.com) swIPe is a network-layer security protocol for the IP protocol suite. IP datagrams are encapsulated within swIPe packets using an extension of IPIP, the IP-inside-IP protocol used by Mobile*IP; swIPe packets are themselves IP datagrams. HannaH is a centrally-managed communications security software product that mediates accesses to secure channels between applications communicating over TCP/IP. HannaH's mediation enforces access control between users, hosts and applications (network connections) over the network. HannaH is implemented within the operating system, in UNIX systems, and in place of the WINSOCK.DLL, on Windows systems. Finally, Cylink's SecureLan is a product family including integrated software and hardware products for enterprise network security. SecureLan products are primarily hardware/firmware based but there are software products for Windows systems (e.g. SecureStack, a secure TCP/IP stack). Like HannaH, SecureLan products are also centrally managed.
Both HannaH and SecureLan products are mainly suitable for organizations where security concerns are globally decided at a high level and centrally enforced by system/network administrators. However, for more anarchic environments, either in terms of security management, operating system security capabilities or hardware security devices, it may not be easy, or acceptable for users disliking centralized management, to use this approach.
PES architecture
The PES architecture is divided in two sides: the client side and server side.
Client side
On the client side, the transparent user-level approach relies on the interception of (application) calls to dynamic libraries (e.g. libc.so.1.8 in SunOS 4.1.3 or WINSOCK.DLL in Microsoft Windows systems). Applications load the PES dynamic library before loading standard system libraries, and the PES library intercepts a subset of the sockets API, and only those ones (see Figure 3 ). The PES library decides whether an intercepted function should involve any extra processing before actually invoking the original function in the system libraries. Figure 3 also shows in pseudo-C code the PES library send() function. For each possible file descriptor the PES library maintains a data structure containing all relevant information for implementing network security. File descriptors are split into three categories: stream socket, if referring to a stream socket in the Internet domain; secure, if referring to a stream socket used by a secure channel; and irrelevant for all other cases. Secure channels are created during the remote connection of stream sockets. Naturally, most of the PES library functionality is related to secure descriptors and, in general, all function invocations referring to non-secure descriptors are immediately forwarded to original libraries without further processing.
Server side
On the server side, PES uses a trusted proxy server to assist in the setting up of secure channels and, if necessary, in handling secure data transfers between remote clients and local ¡ File descriptors should be interpreted only as socket descriptors for Microsoft Windows systems.
servers. The term "trusted" means that PES proxies can only be executed by the administrator (root) and, therefore, clients can trust a remote PES proxy of a given node in the same way they trust privileged servers running on that node. PES proxies use port 700 from those reserved for use by privileged processes.
Both clients and servers using the PES library cooperate with PES proxies to create secure channels: clients use remote PES proxies on the nodes of target servers, whereas servers use their local PES proxy. Secure channels are created together by a client's PES library and PES proxies but, afterwards, are handled on the server side either by servers, if they use the PES library (alternative I), or otherwise by PES proxies (alternative II). In either case, however, the stream connection underlying each secure channel always uses port 700 for the peer's Internet address on the servers' side, thus not revealing the original server's address and masking well-know remote client-server connections.
Alternative I -server using the PES library
If a server can be dynamically linked to the PES library then it handles PES secure channels by itself (diagram I of Figure 1) . A server using the PES library transparently instructs the local PES proxy about all the Internet addresses where it is expecting remote stream connections and waits for normal client connections.
After accepting a client connection, the PES proxy creates a secure channel and transfers all the secure channel information, including the file descriptor of the underlying stream connection, to the client's target server by means of two sockets: (i) the Internet domain socket where the server waits for client connections, and (ii) a UNIX domain socket created by the server's PES library and registered in the PES proxy. The first socket is used to activate the server's acceptance of a presumed client connection, while the second socket is used to transfer the secure channel information to the server's PES library in order to set up a secure channel directly between the server and the client. Both PES proxies and servers' PES libraries use authentication mechanisms to prevent any abusive use of those sockets but, for the sake of simplicity, those mechanisms will not be described here.
Alternative II -server not using the PES library
If a server is not using, or cannot use, the PES library, then it will not handle PES secure channels by itself. Therefore, a PES proxy stands in the middle of a secure client-server communication path (diagram II of Figure 1 ), acting as server from the client's point of view and as client from the server's point of view. After accepting a client connection, the PES proxy creates a secure channel and establishes a normal local connection with the client's target server. Afterward, it blindly push-pulls bytes between the two interlocutors: client's data is decrypted and sent to the server and server's data is encrypted and sent to the client.
In this scenario, the server is mislead, inferring from the PES proxy's Internet address that its client is local. This is not a problem, but in some cases it may be fatal to the client-server protocol. For instance, the rsh command fails because the rshd daemon attempts to connect back to a client socket using the Internet address of the PES proxy. The locality of PES proxies can also introduce a security breach if servers are more permissive to local clients than to remote ones. Thus, this alternative must be restricted to a limited set of client-server applications and the restrictions can be imposed either by PES proxies or client's PES libraries. PES proxies can be instructed by administrators about the set of server ports that cannot, or should not, be accessed using this alternative. Client's PES libraries can be instructed by users, by means of environment variables and configuration files, to enable or disable Alternative II when setting up secure channels for specific servers (see Figure 4 , step 1).
Creation of a secure channel
On the client side, a secure channel creation is activated when a stream socket descriptor is connected to a remote socket (where the client's target server is waiting for connections). Such creation requires a negotiation between the client's PES library and the remote PES proxy running on the node where the target server also runs. If the negotiation succeeds then the socket descriptor becomes secure. In any other case it remains as stream socket and the connection request is passed to the original libraries.
The PES library-proxy negotiation protocol uses the Diffie-Hellman public-key algorithm to generate a shared secret seed, from which cipher parameters are derived, namely the secure channel's encryption/decryption key ( ). The negotiation protocol terminates with the authentication of the PES proxy. 
, possible cipher procedures (4) C¡ P:
, cipher procedure (5.1) P: Compute (see Appendix A). The secure channel's encryption/decryption key is computed in steps 5.2 and 6.2 by hashing the seed with the MD5 one-way hash function [9] .
In step 3, the PES proxy also instructs the PES library about the possible cipher procedures that may be used in the secure channel. The PES library makes the final decision in step 4, possibly with some user guidance § . Servers using the PES library use step 0 register themselves in the local PES proxy and also to constrain the information given on their behalf by PES proxies in step 3. Currently PES allows only one cipher procedure, which is based on the IDEA symmetric algorithm (see section 5.1).
Communication over a secure channel
Once a socket descriptor becomes secure, the PES library encrypts and decrypts all data sent and received through the socket it refers to. Encryption and decryption operations are performed using the cipher procedures and parameters previously agreed between the PES library and a PES proxy during the connection of the socket. In this section, we will describe several aspects of the communication over secure channels, namely the cipher procedure, the secure channels' input/output buffering, and Out-Of-Band data flows.
Data encryption and decryption in a secure channel
The cipher procedure for encrypting and decrypting data in a secure channel uses the IDEA symmetric block encryption algorithm [11] and a feedback cipher mode which complicates cryptanalysis and provides integrity control.
The IDEA algorithm encrypts and decrypts 8-byte data blocks. Since applications may request the PES library to send and receive any number of bytes, is up to the cipher mode to adapt those requests to block encryption. A stream cipher mode, 8-bit CFB (Cipher Feedback), is used in STEL, but is not suitable for PES because it is too slow for bulk transfer (one encryption or decryption per transferred byte). STEL also uses a block cipher mode, CBC (Cipher Block Chaining), to transmit large data blocks, leaving CFB for terminal I/O. In ! By means of environment variables and configuration files.
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Value that in theory was never used before. SSL, messages are packed into records including a header, padding data and a Message Authentication Code (MAC) for integrity control, and records are encrypted using CBC. MACs are generated from the corresponding messages using MD5 or SHA one-way digest/hashing functions [9, 12] . Unfortunately, with current software implementations, the time consumed in computing MACs using MD5 or SHA is not negligible when compared with the time consumed in IDEA encrypt/decrypt operations.
In PES we use a cipher mode similar to the one used in SSL. First the message is packed into a record starting with a 2-byte header containing the message length (allowing up to 64 Kbyte messages), and terminating with a MAC (see Figure 5 ). Records have a length multiple of 8-byte blocks and MACs are also used to pad them. The record is then encrypted one block at the time using the PES PCBC cipher mode (see below) and the IDEA encryption function before being sent to the network. The ciphertext receiver reads a full record, decrypts it and compares the received MAC value with the expected one. If there is a mismatch then the ciphertext was modified. Unlike for SSL, where MAC values must be computed for each message, we tried to use constant MAC values, one for each secure channel; this in order to save the time of MAC computations when generating records or checking their integrity. To do so, we designed a new cipher mode that will be referred to as PES PCBC. PES PCBC was inspired by PCBC (Propagating CBC), the encryption mode used by Kerberos version 4 [6] and latter abandoned in version 5 because of a security weakness. PCBC is a variation of CBC using plaintext and ciphertext feedback with the following algorithm: 
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represent the encryption and decryption functions using key . The plaintext feedback of PCBC propagates an incorrect decryption of a ciphertext block to all following blocks, allowing to conclude about the integrity of a message by checking a standard block at the end of it. The PCBC weakness relies on the fact that an attacker can swap two ciphertext blocks of a message without provoking the desired error propagation. The PES PCBC cipher mode also uses plaintext and ciphertext feedback but does not suffer from the PCBC weakness. Mathematically, PES PCBC looks like the following (see also Figure 5 ):
The PES PCBC cipher mode uses plaintext feedback in a different way than PCBC by adding it to the output of the encryption function instead of adding it to the input of the same function (and vice-versa for the decryption function). By doing so, we avoid the PCBC weakness. In order to avoid known-plaintext cryptanalysis, PES PCBC uses , are generated by hashing with MD5 the seed previously negotiated for the secure channel (cf. section 4).
PES library input/output buffering
The PES library, when sending or receiving ciphertext to or from secure channels, uses its own buffers to store ciphertext. In fact, during write operations application-supplied buffers should not be modified, and during read requests they may be too short to store enough ciphertext bytes so that the requested plaintext bytes could be effectively read (due to the cipher mode used). Therefore, PES library uses an input and output buffer per secure channel.
For write operations, plaintext bytes are encrypted and stored in PES library's fixed-size output buffers before being sent. Since it may be impossible to immediately transfer library output buffers to the system, the PES library uses the return value of write functions to "force" well-behaved applications to repeat those functions until the completion of the transfer.
Large write requests are internally divided into smaller ones to increase the parallelism between the client and server cipher procedures. Early tests with throughput benchmarks in local network environments of UNIX machines showed that output buffers with 1024 bytes are, in average, an appropriate choice; the benchmarks used both default (4096 Kbytes) and bigger (32 Kbytes) sizes for socket's system buffers. PES proxies' sockets use the TCP option TCP NODELAY to speed up the transmission of data to both client and server.
Encrypted text is read into the PES library input buffers before being decrypted to the buffers supplied by the application. The PES library dynamically allocates transient input buffers which are big enough to hold the next encrypted record. It is possible, however, to obtain more plaintext bytes from a record than those requested. These extra bytes cannot go back to the socket and are cached by the PES library for future read operations.
Out-Of-Band data
Stream sockets provide an urgent data transmission mechanisms by marking data as OutOf-Band (OOB) on a send operation. OOB data flows through sockets in parallel with normal, in-band data, and applications can send or receive data as normal data or as OOB data (see peer A in Figure 6 ). Thus, a secure channel supporting OOB data would have to handle the secure transmission and reception of two independent data flows. Nevertheless, we decided not to cipher secure channel's OOB data because we believe the amount of data transmitted OOB is too small to raise significant confidentiality problems. Stream sockets also allow applications to receive OOB data in-line, i.e. mixed within inband data . Received OOB data remain marked accordingly but can be read like normal, in-band data (see peer B in Figure 6 ). However, the encryption mode used by the PES library to implement secure channels do not uphold transparent and random insertions of OOB bytes in in-band data. In such cases, the PES library looks for bytes marked as OOB within in-band data and takes a different action according to the nature of the data (genuine in-band or OOB).
Performance evaluation
The performance of PES was evaluated with a specific benchmark running in two closely connected machines. Both machines are SPARCstations 10/30 with 32 Mbyte RAM and running SunOS 4.1.3 connected by a 10 Mbit/s 10Base-T Ethernet network. This scenario represents the worst test case environment since it increases the overhead introduced by PES in the overall secure communication. The overheads would be much smaller in wide-area networks or configurations including gateways. The current implementation of the IDEA algorithm takes 13.7 ¡ s to encrypt or decrypt 8-byte blocks on these machines. The charts presented in Table 1 show latency and throughput values evaluated by the benchmark. It is composed by a client application continuously sending and receiving fixedsize data buffers through stream sockets to and from an echoing server. The three processes, The three first columns of the tables show values measured when using plain UNIX sockets and PES secure channels bypassing or using PES proxies, respectively. The fourth column shows the contribution of PES proxies, when not bypassing them, to the total overhead of PES secure channels. From those values, we conclude that PES presents a low latency time, mainly without proxies, and a throughput about 2.3 to 4.4 times lower than the maximum throughput of stream sockets. The throughput degradation of PES secure channels is mostly imputable to IDEA encryptions/decryptions. Nevertheless, the overhead introduced by PES proxies is relevant, mainly for small buffers. We believe, however, that the throughput of PES secure channels is acceptable for most applications, namely those that are mainly user-interactive (e.g. telnet). For bulk transfer applications, like ftp, the security introduced by PES has noticeable costs, although not too severe.
Finally, the fifth column of the charts presents the time expended by the PES library, per each 8-byte block of the buffers, in encrypt and decrypt operations. This time was computed from the values measured for plain UNIX sockets and for PES secure channels without proxy. This time goes smaller with increasing buffers size, eventually reaching a value inferior to one single IDEA encryption or decryption (13.7 ¡ s). This is due to the overlap in the execution of the client and the server (or PES proxy) and to the decreasing network bandwidth of UNIX sockets for larger buffers.
Conclusions and current status
The approach followed in PES proved to be a simple and practical solution to provide transparent confidentiality and host authentication to remote communications used by ex-isting client-server applications. Some statically-linked servers can still be accessed through PES secure channels, although less efficiently.
Performance tests run on Sun SPARCstations showed a low latency time and an acceptable throughput degradation. The overhead introduced by PES is mainly due to IDEA encryptions and decryptions. Experiments with several client-server applications, like telnet, ftp, and several X11 and WWW applications, demonstrate that the overhead of PES secure channels, although noticeable, is not too severe. But there will always exist a tradeoff between performance and level of security.
PES is currently a research prototype and will be placed in the public domain. The PES library and proxy server for UNIX systems are currently being used on Sun Sparc machines running SunOS 3. 
